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ON LAWSON ON PRECEDENT
AKHIL REED .AMAR*
Gary Lawson has done it again. l He's given us an obviously
elegant, apparently logical, and yet utterly perverse argument.
Indeed I think it's that combination that gives Gary so much
pleasure.
Now, far be it from me today to try to refute Gary's argument.
I'm not that smart, or perhaps not that dumb. I do believe Gary
has very usefully focused attention on the status of precedent for
those of us who subscribe to Marbury's vision of constitutional-
ism.2 At the very least, he's fixed our gaze on the tension between
stare decisis and quite common modes of constitutional argument
today.
Let me sketch out four possible responses that people who
might not be convinced might try to pursue. I'm not going to
develop any of these in completeness, but I think this is where
the debate should go if we take Gary's argument seriously, as I
think we should.
First, let us begin, as did Charles Fried,S with the practice of
precedent in England and America at the time the Constitution
was adopted. As I read him and hear him, Gary seems to concede
that courts sometimes misinterpreted statutes, and yet in subse-
quent cases gave effect to those misinterpretations, even after the
courts were convinced that the earlier pronouncements were in-
deed incorrect. If that understanding of the judicial role was im-
bedded in the notion of "judicial Power"-a prominent phrase in
Article III of the U.S. Constitution-Gary's argument would run
into trouble. Gary's response, as I understand it, is to remind us
that the Constitution is supreme law: It trumps statutes, so, for
sure, it trumps incorrect judicial decisions.4
The possible problem with that argument, however, is that in
England statutes are supreme law. P~liament is sovereign. If a
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. What follows is a lightly edited ver-
sion of my oral remarks at the Twelfth Annual National Federalist Society Symposium on
Law and Public Policy, in response to a paper presented by Gary Lawson. See Gary Lawson,
The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 23 (1994).
1. Cf. Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1639
(1993) (making a similar point about another author).
2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. Charles Fried, Reply to Lawson, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 35 (1994).
4. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 29-30.
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judicial misconstruction can trump a sovereign statute-the
highest law promulgated by the sovereign Parliament-then one
might ask why the same thing might not be true for the Constitu-
tion in America. Let me also note that because Gary's analysis
focuses so much on the unique status of the Constitution, it is
less than clear to me that his argument would equally apply to
stare decisis in American statutory cases. Even though he said that
he thought it would,5 he did not defend that claim here today. I
think one would need to go beyond his remarks in order to do
that. That's the first possible line of attack.
A second and connected line would focus on the possibility (to
coin a rather awkward phrase) of "blessing enactments." The ba-
sic concept in the statutory context would be as follows. A statute
is passed at time TI, and misinterpreted by a court at time T2, yet
the legislature at some later time T3 passes another statute that
seems to accept the misinterpretation: to embrace it, to bless it.
Then at time T4, when a court revisits the initial statute, perhaps
the court is perfectly legitimate to stick with its initial misinter-
pretation because the legislature has blessed it with a subsequent
enactment. (Some people, for example, might argue that such
was the case with Runyon v. McCrary,6 which might have been
wrongly decided in 1976, but which was reaffirmed by Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union7 in 1989, possibly in reliance on intervening
congressional legislation that seemed to bless the Runyon
decision.) 8
Whether that argument from the statutory context could be
applied to the constitutional context is an interesting question. I
once took a course from Judge Bork and I floated, rather
thoughtlessly, an argument that perhaps if the Warren Court had
not rendered certain constitutional decisions in the 1960s, the
Constitution at that time would have been amended to embrace
some of those readings. So, I argued, perhaps those precedents
should be followed today because they were the functional
equivalent of an amendment. Judge Bork looked at me and
said-I remember this quite vividly-"That is not an argument in
our legal culture." It may not be, but I would note that Justice
5. See id. at 24.
6. 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
7. 491 U.S. 164, 170 (1989).
8. For more discussion of the possible importance of this intelVening legislation. see
Paul Gewirtz, Reverse Discrimination: Precedent and the Rehnquist Court, NEW REpUBUC, Oct.
24, 1988, at 13.
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Scalia in the Union GaP case a few years ago seemed to make a
rather similar argument. He suggested that in Hans v. Louisianalo
in 1890, perhaps the Eleventh Amendment was misinterpreted,
but that nevertheless, judges today should probably stick with
that misinterpretation because the Seventeenth Amendment,
modifying the rules for how Senators are selected, might have
been predicated on the then-prevalent misunderstanding that
Hans represented.ll So, Justice Scalia, if I read him correctly in
Union Gas, suggested the possibility of blessing enactments at the
level of subsequent constitutional amendments that have presup-
posed the earlier judicial case law.
A third possible line of attack would put some pressure on
Gary's effort to distinguish sharply between vertical and horizon-
tal precedent. Vertical precedent, you will recall, involves a situa-
tion where a lower judge thinks that the higher court is wrong.
Gary says that perhaps the lower judge is obliged to follow not
her own oath of office and best understanding of the Constitu-
tion, but rather the (hypothesized) misinterpretationI2 of a
higher court. Ifwe take seriously the idea that the Constitution is
the supreme law, however, and perhaps that every person should
interpret it directly and follow it, it is not clear that vertical prece-
dent should be distinguished from horizontal precedent. Fred
Schauer has made this point as well.13 Mike Paulsen, for exam-
ple, has argued that in some situations a lowerjudge should sim-
ply say to a higher court: "Go ahead, make my day: reverse me.
You're wrong about the Constitution. You've taken your oath of
office, but that's no excuse for my violating mine. I'm going to
follow my oath of office and decide the Constitution correctly as
I understand it. If you don't like it, take cert."14
Ifwe don't buy the "make my day" argument, which is compati-
ble in many ways with Gary's overall approach, it might be be-
cause we see an implicit hierarchy that is at least permitted-
perhaps compelled-by Article III, where the oaths of office and
the interpretations of higher courts trump those of lowerjudges.
Yet if we see an implicit vertical hierarchy, perhaps we could
9. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
10. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
11. 491 U.S. at 30-35 (Scalia,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 24.
13. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Neassary Externality of Constitutional Nrmns,
17 HARv. ].L. & PUB. POL'y 45, 47 (1994).
14. See Michael S. Paulsen, Accusing]ustia: Some Variations on the Themes ofRobert M.
Covers]ustice Accused, 7]. LAw & RELIGION 33, 82-88 (1989).
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equally read in an implicit temporal hierarchy that endows an ear-
lier court with a certain priority over later courts-especially if
the earlier court is much closer in time to the relevant constitu-
tional enactment. James Madison, for example, seemed to think
that the Constitution was ambiguous in certain aspects, but those
ambiguities would be clarified-his word was "liquidated"I5-by
early precedents, bothjudicial and political (in the executive and
legislative branches).16 Madison's approach seemed to give prior-
ity to the first courts to hear certain issues. That's the third line
of attack-pressing the distinction between vertical and horizon-
tal precedent: Ifyou buy the idea of vertical hierarchy, why not
temporal hierarchy?
A final line ofattack might push hard on Gary's effort to distin-
guish sharply between stare decisis on the one hand, and res judi-
cata on the other. Gary says that even if a court gets it wrong,
perhaps that misinterpretation should be final as between the
parties in that case.I7 Under this approach, even if a later court is
convinced that, for example, Plessy v. FergusonI8 was an error,
Plessy's judgment arguably should stand as the law of the case for
the parties involved.
Well, perhaps judicial opinions must be final in the sense of
being immune from executive revision in order to satisfy a cer-
tain vision of the Constitution. We all learned that from
Haybum ~ Case:19 Executives cannot review and reverse judicial
opinions. Of course, the judicial power of the United States em-
phatically does not require that a judge's decision be immune
from reversal by otherjudges. A decision that lacks finality in the
sense that some other judges could overrule you is not an "advi-
sory opinion." This happens everyday, I suppose; when our mod-
erator, Judge Ginsburg, hears a case, for example, he almost
invariably faces the possibility that another set ofjudges will re-
verse him.
Ifyou buy the concept that, vertically, there can be reversal by
a higher court, why not horizontally and temporally? If you take
Gary's overall approach seriously, you might well believe that a
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
16. For a rich and thoughtful analysis ofMadison's understanding ofjudicial and polit-
ical precedent on constitutional issues, see H.]efferson Powell. The Original Understanding
of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885, 935-41 (1985).
17. See Lawson, supra note 1, at 27.
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
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later court should indeed ignore res judicata and undo an incor-
rect judgment between parties based on an incorrect reading of
the Constitution. If, conversely, you don't buy that conclusion, if
you think-as does Gary, it seems-that res judicata actually does
sometimes bar reconsideration, what you are conceding, it seems
to me, is that the very concept ofjurisdiction may subsume the
power to get it wrong sometimes. Maybe jurisdiction is the right
to be wrong in a certain domain. If that is true between the par-
ties, as the res judicata issue might suggest and as Gary seems to
concede, perhaps that could equally be true when the question is
rather the precedential effect of the decision for non-parties:
stare decisis. The notion of jurisdiction as "the right to get it
wrong" sometimes might be analogous to the political question
doctrine-a doctrine which seems, in some ways, in tension with
the general idea ofjudicial review. Yet we might think, for exam-
ple, that it's up to the Senate to decide how to try impeachments.
Even if the rules that Senators promulgate are misunderstand-
ings of the Constitution, they have jurisdiction to decide that.
They are the relevant court, and no other court should try to
overturn their approach. Jurisdiction may subsume, in some
cases, the power to get it wrong.
So those are four possible-admittedly sketchy and tentative-
responses to Gary's argument. Let me conclude by saying that
I'm troubled by these responses too because, although they seem
to disagree with Gary's position, they may share a common fea-
ture with it. Gary's position is that precedent is affirmatively un-
constitutional.20 Some of the counter-arguments I have raised
may tend to suggest that precedents always have to be followed.
So there may be a knife-edged quality to some of the arguments
that fails to account for our current practice-which, as Professor
Fried reminded us, embraces neither extreme.21 Precedents
need not always be followed, but they are entitled to some rather
than zero weight. Yet some of the arguments marshalled against
Gary may share more in common with his approach than one
might first think. So we may have a knife-edged quality to the
debate which would, if taken seriously, lead us to outlandish and
perverse results either at one extreme (precedent counts for
nothing) or at the other extreme (it counts for everything, as
until recently in the House of Lords).
20. See Lawson, supra note I, at 24.
21. See Fried, supra note 3, at 36-37.
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There was once a time when I was not troubled by such knife-
edged peIVerse arguments. I am a little bit troubled today. Maybe
that just shows that I'm going soft in myoId age.
